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Renamo fought a bloody war from 1976 to 1992 against the 
socialist Frelimo government that devastated the country, but 
since Renamo had been created by Rhodesia and 
subsequently supported by South Africa, the internal 
dimensions of the conflict were played down. However, the 
resistance of large sections of Mozambican society against 
the authoritarian politics of the Frelimo regime explains why 
Renamo did not remain a small guerrilla force but finally 
controlled entire regions of the country. The excessive 
violence against civilians by Renamo obscured the fact that 
in certain regions the movement enjoyed popular support. 
The conflict in Mozambique was both a modern war with 
sophisticated weapons and an armed conflict where ritual 
powers played a role. After the war, collective and individual 
rituals contributed to the reconciliation of the warring 
parties and the reintegration of individuals into their local 
communities. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Just one year after independence and the end of the struggle by the Liberation 
Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) against the Portuguese colonial army, 
Mozambique once again became a theatre of war when the Mozambican 
National Resistance (Renamo) began its campaign against the socialist Frelimo 
government. The war lasted twelve years and was one of the most violent and 
destructive periods in post-colonial African history. The conflict was not only a 
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modern war with sophisticated weapons and the interference of foreign powers 
but was also an armed conflict in which traditional methods of warfare and 
ritual powers were influential. Renamo used terror and excessive violence often 
of a ritualized form in areas controlled by the government and in zones where 
initial popular support for Renamo had vanished due to the forced recruitment 
of youngsters and the coercive methods the rebels employed to compel people 
to hand over food. This chapter considers the violence not as the individual acts 
of sadistic commanders or the consequence of poor military discipline but as 
Renamo’s way of deliberately terrorizing the local population. However 
violence and terror tactics were not the prerogative of the Renamo forces and 
were employed equally by government forces. 
 About one million people lost their lives during the conflict, an estimated 
200,000 children were orphaned and another 250,000 separated from their 
families.1 Some 1.7 million people, more than 10 per cent of the total 
population, fled to neighbouring countries and another 4.3 million people 
became so-called deslocados (displaced persons) and sought refuge in the cities 
and other government-controlled areas2 while the rebels systematically 
destroyed their schools, hospitals and government buildings. The excessive 
violence against civilians frequently tended to obscure the fact that there were 
considerable regional differences on both sides as far as the relationship 
between soldiers and the local population was concerned.  
Popular resistance by large sectors of Mozambican society to the 
modernization projects of the socialist Frelimo regime, as well as the regional 
contradictions stemming from the (pre-)colonial era and the widespread use of 
violence can all help to explain how Renamo was able develop from a small, 
externally created rebel group into a large guerrilla army that finally controlled 
entire regions of the country. 
 
 
The origins of Renamo 
 
Renamo was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian secret service, the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to attack Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) bases across the border in Mozambique and 
destabilize the Frelimo regime because of the support it offered the 
                                                 
1 A.A. de Abreu, ‘Mozambican Women Experiencing Violence’, in M. Turshen & C. 
Taagiramariya (eds), What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa 
(London & New York, 1998), 74. 
2 S. Maslen, ILO Action Programme on Skills and Entrepreneurship. Training for 
Countries Emerging from Armed Conflict. The Reintegration of War-Affected Youth: 
The Experience of Mozambique (1997), 1. 
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Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU).3 However the Rhodesian army 
itself also attacked ZANLA bases, refugee camps and infrastructure in central 
Mozambique. For example, during a raid on a refugee camp in Nyazonia 
(Manica Province) in 1976 the Rhodesians killed some 600 people.4  
The first members of Renamo recruited by the Rhodesians were demobilized 
Mozambican soldiers of the Portuguese colonial army and former Frelimo 
guerrillas who had fallen into disgrace at home. The rebel group was not given 
any political programme during its three-month military training in Odzi, 
Rhodesia but recruits were submitted to anti-communist and anti-Frelimo 
propaganda. The Rhodesians used to pay the rebels a regular monthly salary and 
an additional bonus for every successful operation they undertook,5 money that 
was an important motivational factor that encouraged young men, and their 
families in central Mozambique, to participate in the war.6  
 
Violent recruitment methods 
Many of the Renamo fighters were young men and children kidnapped during 
attacks on their villages.7 In many cases Renamo forced children to kill one of 
their parents or a relative to break their links with the community and bind them 
to the movement through shame and guilt. Child soldiers were reportedly forced 
to smoke a mixture of soruma (marijuana) and gunpowder to increase their 
courage and physical strength.8 Child units were primarily employed in attacks 
on civilians and in looting raids on local communities to provide bases with 
supplies. They were rarely involved in direct confrontations with government 
troops.9 Most children were abducted in the south where Renamo was less well-
established among the local population. Escape was risky since Renamo would 
retaliate with immediate execution and abducted men and children were usually 
taken to distant training camps to prevent escape. In addition, the threat of being 
                                                 
3 At the time the official designation was Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). 
4 W. Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles & London, 1992), 31. 
5 G. Tajú, ‘Renamo: Os factos que conhecemos’, Cadernos de História. Boletim do 
Departamento de História da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 7 (1988), 16. 
6 J. Schafer, ‘Guerrillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: De-socialization or 
Re-socialization?’, African Affairs, 100 (2001), 224. 
7 Female soldiers fought on both sides during the conflict but their numbers were 
insignificant. Only 1,380 women were demobilized (about 1.5 per cent of the total of 
92,881). J. Schafer, ‘A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled. AMODEG and 
the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 1 
(1998), 16. 
8 Ibid. 16 & 21. 
9 O. Roesch, ‘Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: A View from Gaza 
Province’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 26 (3), 472. 
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punished by the government after their return discouraged the captives from 
abandoning Renamo. Anyone who escaped the clutches of Renamo was likely 
to find himself in a no-win situation as government forces frequently accused 
escaped captives of having failed to fight Renamo forces or of being Renamo 
collaborators, in which case they were severely punished. 
Promotion within Renamo military ranks was not dependent on how a 
person had been recruited and some of those abducted during Renamo raids 
even made it to the rank of general. One, for example, had been travelling in a 
bus full of young men who had been forcefully recruited by the government 
when Renamo attacked the vehicle and took all the men to their own training 
camp.  
Frelimo used to act similarly and did not only regularly organize raids to 
kidnap young men for military service, but also recruited children by force, 
albeit to a lesser extent than Renamo. At the time of their recruitment, 16,553 
government soldiers (23.3 per cent of the total Frelimo soldiers later 
demobilized) and 8,945 Renamo guerrillas (40.7 per cent) had been under 18 
years of age. Another 4,334 Renamo soldiers (19.7 per cent of total ex-Renamo 
fighters) and 3,073 government soldiers were aged between 10 and 14 at the 
time of their abduction and can be considered child soldiers.10 According to a 
survey conducted during the demobilization process, 82 per cent of Frelimo 
soldiers and 87 per cent of Renamo guerrillas were recruited by force.11  
To increase the educational level of its cadres, Renamo lured some 200 
secondary school students into its ranks by promising scholarships to study 
abroad. However, the opportunities never materialized and many of the students 
died in the rebel camps of disease and hardship.12 While coercion was dominant 
in recruitment, voluntary participation in the war was due to a lack of 
alternative opportunities. Basic survival and the chance of gaining access to 
goods and food, and sometimes a vague notion of political conviction against 
Frelimo’s socialist projects played a role in the recruitment process.13 Even in 
the south of the country where Renamo did not enjoy much popular support and 
despite the dangers of war and the Renamo’s notoriously strict discipline, young 
men were attracted by the excitement of guerrilla life, adventure, the availability 
                                                 
10 S. Barnes, The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in 
Mozambique. The Soldiers’ View (Maputo, 1997), 17. Children under 15 years of age at 
the end of the war were excluded from the official demobilization process. 
11 Schafer, ‘A Baby’, 217.  
12 J.C.G. Pereira, ‘The Politics of Survival: Peasants, Chiefs and Renamo in Meringue 
District, Mozambique, 1982-1992’, Unpublished MA thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, 1999), 43. 
13 Schafer, ‘Guerrillas’, 236. 
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of women, and easy access to looted goods.14 Occasionally during Renamo 
attacks on local communities, young boys even joined the rebels in looting their 
neighbours’ houses and then left with the attackers. Everywhere in the 
impoverished country large sectors of the population found themselves without 
schooling, skills or employment. The rampant economic crisis and the 
devastating war had increased the numbers of those marginalized, creating a 
fertile ground for further Renamo recruitment. Derluguian suggests that people 
who find themselves constantly in a situation of disintegrating social relations 
and generalized instability caused by crisis and war lose any immunity to 
violence and easily become both its object and subject.15 
 
 
Renamo’s military organization 
 
Renamo was never composed of loosely operating small units but was a 
centrally organized and hierarchical military organization. Under the 
supervision of Afonso Dhlakama who became Renamo’s president and 
commander-in-chief in 1980, there was a 15-member military council 
composed of the three principal commanders of the north, centre and south 
zones and ten provincial commanders. The basic operational unit was a 
company of some 100 to 150 men, generally stationed at a central main base 
with smaller attached bases responsible for special tasks such as security and 
patrols. A company was divided into platoons, while two or three companies 
formed a battalion. Usually two or more battalions were based near the 
provincial headquarters but spread over several bases. Each company had 
modern radio transmission facilities operated by a communications officer who 
was in regular contact with the provincial base and indirectly with the 
headquarters in Gorongosa. The general staff was equipped with a system 
capable of frequency hopping that impeded detection by government forces.  
While the middle and lower-level cadres were multi-ethnic,16 the military 
leadership was dominated by Ndau speakers from central Mozambique, a 
subgroup of the Shona to which Dhlakama also belongs. They were the first to 
have been recruited by the Rhodesians and over time had assumed senior 
                                                 
14 A. Harneit-Sievers, ‘Sozialgeschichte des Bürgerkrieges in Mosambik. Ein Workshop 
in Maputo’, Afrika Spectrum 30, 1 (1995), 88; Roesch, ‘Renamo and the Peasantry’, 
476. 
15 G. Derluguian, ‘Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Postcolonial 
Mozambique’, Review XIII, 4 (1990), 439-62. 
16 M. Cahen, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique’, in E. Braathen, 
M. Bøås & G. Sæther, Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in 
SubSaharan Africa (New York & Houndmills, 2000), 172. 
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positions within Renamo’s military hierarchy. Consequently, Ndau was the 
official language in Gorongosa and at many bases, but the lingua franca used in 
a particular unit depended on the ratio of different ethnic groups represented in 
its ranks.17 When Renamo arrived in a new area the majority of the rebels were 
Ndau speakers. However, over time they became the commanders, while the 
majority of the ordinary guerrillas were local people. Also the madjuba (sing. 
ndjuba),18 the local Renamo representatives and spies, used to come from the 
native population. Many had been colonial tax collectors or junior officials 
dismissed by Frelimo after independence. The madjuba maintained links 
between the Renamo base and the local population and were in charge of the 
labour recruitment of carriers and others. They did not usually live on the base, 
but nearby. They were not issued with firearms but used knives, machetes or 
other similar weapons. It was the madjuba who were said to have committed 
many of the worst atrocities during the war and regularly mutilated their victims 
by cutting off their ears, noses, and hands. 
 
Renamo bases 
The principal bases were established in sparsely populated regions but at a 
distance of less than about 50 km from more densely populated areas and main 
roads since the rebels needed access to these areas for supplies.19 The excellent 
radio communication of Renamo troops enabled dispersed units to assemble 
quickly to mount large-scale attacks and then disperse again.  
Although Renamo’s communication system was superior to the Frelimo’s, 
the rebels had almost no heavy artillery or mechanized transport20 so its troops 
had to cover large distances on foot, sometimes walking more than 500 km. 
They relied on the plundering of local food stocks and the abduction of local 
people to supply their labour requirements. During looting and pillaging raids, 
everything that could be transported was taken away: cattle, pigs, poultry, 
foodstuffs, clothes, radios, china and household items. To supply the food needs 
of the base, Renamo soldiers exchanged looted goods with the local population 
for foodstuffs and some of the captured goods were even sold in neighbouring 
countries. During their attacks, Renamo forced local inhabitants to carry the 
booty back to the military base and as they were often taken by surprise during 
night-time raids they had to walk barefoot and in their underwear. In a few 
cases the captives even had to walk distances of more than 250 km to the 
                                                 
17 M. Hall, ‘The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study in the 
Destruction of an African Country’, Africa, 60, 1 (1990), 46. 
18 ZANU used the same designation for supporters within the local population. 
19 G. Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Mosambik ca. 1980-1992. Abläufe und 
struktureller Wandel des Landes’, Unpublished manuscript (Maputo, 1995), 14. 
20 Finnegan, A Complicated War, 58. 
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bases.21 Usually the whole group walked in Indian file, with the rebels at either 
end and in the middle to prevent the abducted inhabitants escaping. During the 
march to the base only the guerrillas were allowed to eat. Exhausted load 
carriers who were unable to walk further would be killed in front of the others 
and babies were murdered immediately as the rebels feared that their crying 
would alert government forces to their presence. Renamo soldiers frequently 
raped the mainly female carriers during the retreat in front of the other captives. 
Most men and some of the women were released after the guerrillas reached 
their bases. Civilians who were forced to stay with the rebels on the base found 
themselves in what was cynically called liberdade (freedom).22 If a Renamo spy 
at the base was recognized by one of the newly arrived captives, he usually 
ordered the immediate execution of the kidnapped, since he feared being 
denounced if the person managed to escape.23 The abducted women and girls 
were forced to join the officers’ and soldiers’ households, either as wives or in 
the case of young girls as servants. Some commanders reportedly had more than 
five women.24 In the early 1980s when the main base was in Garágua (Manica), 
Dhlakama himself was said to have eight wives, who were officially his 
bodyguards.25 As the wife of a military man, a captive woman enjoyed some 
protection and was not expected to render sexual services to other men. 
However, the women of soldiers whose units were transferred remained at the 
base and received new partners.26 Young women in the camps who did not 
become pregnant risked being killed by their partners.27 Newly arrived women 
frequently became the source of disputes between the guerrillas so to avoid 
conflict, the problem was solved by killing the woman.28 The rebels considered 
rape and the use of slave wives as their right of access to women and important 
war booty.29 
                                                 
21 Liesegang,’Der Bürgerkrieg’, 9. 
22 F. Pequenino, ‘Estudo de Caso: Localidade Administrativa de Mugeba (Zambezia), 
1982 a 1992’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 21. 
23 P. de Jesus, ‘Alguns Aspectos do Impacto da Guerra em Certas Zonas de Inharrime e 
Zavala’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 17. 
24 N. Castanheira, Ex-criança Soldado: ‘Não Queremos Voltar para o Inferno’ (Maputo, 
1999), 11. 
25 Tajú, ‘Os factos’, 21. 
26 Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg’, 32. 
27 Ibid. 24. 
28 H.C. Mucusete, ‘Um Estudo de Caso: O Distrito de Angoche’, Unpublished paper. 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 39. 
29 K.B. Wilson, ‘Cults of Violence and Counter Violence in Mozambique’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 18, 3 (1992), 536. 
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The women living on the bases carried goods between bases, looted villages 
and in the case of permanent bases cultivated plots to produce food. Despite the 
threat of immediate execution, married women in particular often tried to escape 
as soon as they had more freedom of movement, while younger single women 
tended to make the best of their situation and only returned home after the war, 
often with children. Some continued their relationships with the fighters but 
most women returned home and were accepted back by their former husbands. 
Families submitted these women and returning child soldiers to purification 
rituals performed by traditional healers or pastors of Zionist churches.30 Schafer 
maintains that during the war both government soldiers and Renamo guerrillas 
considered women in enemy-controlled areas as fair prey for capture and sexual 
abuse, whereas women in their own areas were generally treated according to 
local social norms.31  
A base such as that in Chigowa, Tete Province, was representative of other 
permanent Renamo bases located in the centre and north of the country.32 The 
military command was situated at the centre of the base, surrounded by the 
compounds of guerrillas with more than two or three wives, depending on the 
number of women taken captive. Further out beyond these residences were the 
huts of the single women who had to render sexual services to off-duty soldiers. 
Then came the old people and the children’s houses and the corrals where the 
commanders’ stolen cattle were kept. The base was surrounded by three circular 
protection rings. The machambas, the fields for cultivation, were located 
between the first and second rings. Renamo bases in the south were by contrast 
only small, often mobile, bases that did not usually have fields or permanent 
huts but only provisional tents made of plastic sheets or cotton. In the case of a 
government attack they could easily be moved. The bases relied entirely on 
plunder and looting for their everyday supplies.  
Both soldiers and captives were severely punished for disobedience and the 
bases often had prisons. Child soldiers were not excluded from punishments 
that ranged from corporal punishment, the withholding of food, the amputation 
of fingers, noses and ears, and executions carried out by one or more of the 
other children.33 Captives who could not endure the military training were also 
killed.34 The people on the Renamo bases were also affected by disease and 
periods of famine when attacks and plundering failed to provide sufficient food. 
                                                 
30 E. Muianga, ‘Mulher e a Guerra’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane (Maputo, 1994); Castanheira, Ex-criança Soldado, 12. 
31 Schafer, ‘Guerrillas’, 233. 
32 R.M. Kuyeri, ‘História Social da Guerra em Tete’, Unpublished paper, Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994). 
33 Maslen, ILO Action Programme, 15. 
34 Castanheira, Ex-criança Soldado, 26. 
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If food supplies were limited, the guerrillas received what was available and the 
civilians were simply left to their own devices.35 Some of the permanent bases 
had a military hospital and occasionally Renamo kidnapped curandeiros 
(healers) and pastors of Zionist churches and took them to the bases where they 
were obliged to tend the sick and wounded.36  
 
 
The unfolding of the conflict and external support 
 
The first Renamo attack occurred on 3 February 1977, on the anniversary of the 
death of Frelimo’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane.37 On that day two men 
attacked a school bus on the road between Chimoio and Manica town, just 
across the border, to kidnap students for military training in Rhodesia.38 One of 
the two attackers was the legendary André Matsangaíssa, a Manyika shoemaker 
and former Frelimo guerrilla who had fled to Rhodesia from the re-education 
camp in Sacuza (Gorongoso District, Sofala Province), where he had been 
imprisoned for embezzling funds after independence. Later in 1977, 
Matsangaíssa, who in the meantime had become Renamo’s leader, commanded 
a group that attacked the prison camp in Sacuza and succeeded in freeing 75 
detainees who were all taken to Rhodesia and incorporated into the emerging 
Renamo.39 As a result of Matsangaíssa’s fame Renamo guerrillas became 
popularly known as matsangas, whereas the official propaganda labelled them 
as bandidos armadas (armed bandits). Matsangaíssa was killed during a battle 
with Frelimo in Gorongosa on 17 October 1979 and his succession was fiercely 
disputed. Finally Afonso Dhlakama, the son of a local chief in Sofala Province, 
got his way and became the new Renamo leader. He had reportedly given 
orders to execute his rival Lucas Muchanga, Renamo’s second-in-command at 
the time.40  
During the years of Rhodesian patronage Renamo’s operations were largely 
restricted to the central provinces of Manica and Sofala. Projects associated 
with Frelimo such as so-called lojas do povo (people’s shops), aldeias comunais  
                                                 
35 Pereira, ‘The Politics of Survival’, 48. 
36 Castanheira, Ex-criança soldado, 25. 
37 He was killed by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969. 
38 Personal account of Sebastião Chapepa alias Janota Luís, one of the participants, 
Chimoio, December 1999.  
39 Tempo, 26 January 1997. 
40 In 1983 and 1988 respectively, other internal conflicts resulted in the murders of 
Renamo´s two first secretary-generals: Orlando Christina, a white Portuguese, in South 
Africa, and Evo Fernandes, a Mozambican of Goan descent, near Lisbon, Portugal. 
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(communal villages) and agricultural cooperatives, as well as lorries, buses and 
trains were the principal targets for attack. At that time, Africa Livre, another 
small rebel movement based in Malawi, frequently infiltrated and attacked 
border areas in Zambezia and southern Niassa. 
Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, Renamo was taken over by 
South Africa that was keen to support and equip the movement in an attempt to 
destabilize the Frelimo government. The South Africans were easily able to 
supply Renamo by air or by sea, since Mozambican government forces were 
unable to defend the country’s large air space and its 2,000 km long coastline. 
Pretoria’s political objective was to force Frelimo to abandon its socialist 
policy, pursue a more friendly attitude towards South Africa and deny the ANC 
a safe haven. South Africa was not, however, motivated by a desire to see a 
Renamo government in power in Mozambique.  
Encouraged by its new patrons to promote its international credibility, 
Renamo for the first time opened representations abroad and in 1981 approved a 
political programme calling for a government of national unity, democratic 
elections and a mixed economy. The following year, the movement published a 
list of members of the National Council. However, the political structures 
remained minimal and Renamo was always predominantly a military 
organization.  
With South Africa’s support, the movement began a successful military 
expansion into the country’s remaining provinces. Within two years its strength 
had increased from 500 to 8,000 guerrillas41 and following the opening of a 
northern front with Malawi as a staging ground in 1981, the splinter group 
Africa Livre merged with Renamo. In late 1983 Renamo transferred its 
headquarters from Phalaborwa (Northern Transvaal) to Gorongosa in 
Mozambique. The 35,000 government troops were unable to stop Renamo since 
they were not prepared for anti-guerrilla warfare. Instead, Frelimo forces had 
been trained in conventional army operations, fearing a possible invasion by the 
white Rhodesian and South African minority regimes after independence. 
Government forces were additionally constrained by a lack of education and 
low morale.42  
Faced with the advancing rebels, a non-existent infrastructure and a 
collapsing economy, the Mozambican government sought a peace settlement 
with South Africa and in March 1984 the Nkomati Accord was signed by the 
                                                 
41 C. Alden, ‘Political Violence in Mozambique: Past, Present and Future’, in W. 
Gutteridge & J.E. Spence (eds), Violence in Southern Africa (London & Portland, Or, 
1997), 43. 
42 S.L. Weigert, Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa (New 
York & Houndmills, 1995), 83. 
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two countries. According to this agreement South Africa would end its support 
of Renamo, while Mozambique would expel the ANC. In September 1985 
Mozambican government troops overran the Gorongosa headquarters, but 
Renamo soon recaptured it. Documents found in Gorongosa proved that, despite 
the non-aggression pact, some sectors of the South African regime still 
continued to support Renamo. Military support for Frelimo, provided by 
Tanzanian troops in Quelimane in 1987 and Zimbabwean forces in central 
Mozambique from 1982 onwards, could only temporarily help the government 
troops to recapture some of the lost ground, but was not able to halt the rebels’ 
expansion. Besides, the Zimbabwean contingent’s mission was primarily 
restricted to protecting the Beira-Mutare corridor that provided trade access for 
most of Zimbabwe’s imports. When Renamo had to leave its bases in Malawi in 
late 1986 several thousand expelled fighters invaded Zambezia Province in a 
wave of violence. Subsequently the fighting intensified in the northern 
provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.  
While Renamo controlled large parts of the rural areas, the government 
always maintained control of the cities and most district capitals. Consequently, 
and contrary to what happened in Angola, Mozambique’s larger cities were not 
affected by fighting and shelling at all. The areas permanently defended and 
protected by the government covered little more than 10 per cent of the 
country.43 In areas in central and northern Mozambique that remained 
permanently under its control for many years, Renamo ran schools and a health 
service and reinstalled deposed local chiefs who assumed some juridical and 
administrative functions. The origin of the soldiers reflected the government’s 
control of the urban centres: Frelimo recruited most of its soldiers in the cities, 
while the majority of Renamo troops came from the countryside. 
 
 
Peace 
 
As at the beginning of the conflict, the international and regional political 
constellations were instrumental in the cessation of the bloody war in 
Mozambique. Government troops received weapons, transport, fuel and the 
bulk of its food supplies from abroad44 and Renamo relied on external sources  
                                                 
43 G. Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Mosambik ca. 1980-1992. Abläufe und 
struktureller Wandel des Landes’, unpublished manuscript (Maputo, 1995), 28. 
44 Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg’, 41. 
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for its supply of arms, sea and air transport, and modern communications 
equipment. With the end of apartheid and the Cold War, the warring parties in 
Mozambique lost this necessary external support and were ready to negotiate a 
peace settlement.  
The success of the amnesty offered from early 1988 to Renamo fighters who 
turned themselves over to the authorities was limited. During the two years of 
this programme, Renamo recruited more men than the approximately 4,000 who 
officially surrendered to the government.45 Despite offers of clemency, more 
Frelimo soldiers deserted than did Renamo rebels.46 At the end of the 1980s the 
failure of the socialist development project had forced Frelimo to introduce 
political and economic reforms that largely met both the demands of Renamo 
and the interests of its foreign sponsors. At its 5th party congress, held in mid-
1989, Frelimo dropped all Marxist-Leninist dogma from its programme and a 
new democratic constitution was approved in November the following year. 
Negotiations in the late 1980s brought Renamo the political recognition it 
demanded from Frelimo. After several rounds of negotiations in Rome, with the 
Santo Egídio community serving as mediators, a general peace accord was 
signed in October 1992. Following the end of hostilities 64,130 government 
troops and 22,637 Renamo guerrillas were demobilized under the supervision of 
a special UN mission (UNUMOZ). The number of Renamo soldiers 
considerably surpassed that of the 8,000 Frelimo guerrillas who had fought 
against the Portuguese colonial army during the 1964-1974 liberation struggle 
that had only affected five provinces.47 In the course of this conflict the strength 
of the Portuguese colonial army had increased from 30,000 men to 75,000.48 By 
the end of the colonial war about 60 per cent of the Portuguese army in 
Mozambique were local African troops.49 
 
 
Internal dimensions 
 
As Renamo had been created and supported by the white minority regimes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa, for many years the internal dimensions of the 
conflict were largely played down or completely denied.50 Initially external 
factors dominated the scholarly debate on the war in Mozambique and it was 
preliminarily understood to have taken place as a result of Rhodesian and 
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subsequently South African destabilization that was supported by neo-colonial 
and reactionary groups in Portugal and the United States. This view was largely 
in accordance with that of the Frelimo government that insisted that the conflict 
was a case of external aggression, with Renamo being used as a proxy force.  
Only in the late 1980s following the publication of the pioneering work of 
the late French anthropologist Christian Geffray, who had done research on the 
causes of the conflict in the northern province of Nampula, did the local 
dynamics of the conflict receive more attention and the discussion become more 
open. Geffray demonstrated that conflicts and social changes within the 
peasantry that emerged due to the government’s forced resettlement of many 
people as part of the communal village programme had created a favourable 
environment for Renamo.51 Meanwhile it has become almost uncontested that it 
was popular resistance against Frelimo policies that formed fertile ground for 
the emergence of Renamo. Large sectors of the population resisted government 
policies because they felt marginalized, discriminated against and oppressed. 
 
Resentment of villagization  
Prominent among the groups that resented Frelimo’s policies were the peasants 
and former local chiefs who provided most of Renamo’s support since they 
were most directly affected by the regime’s socialist modernization project.52 
The central government’s ambitious programme of compulsory villagization of 
the countryside, the establishment of the aldeias comunais that forced thousands 
of peasant families to leave their ancestral rural homesteads and move to other 
areas provoked anger and bitterness directed towards Frelimo, particularly when 
the people began to realize that the promised improvements in their living and 
working conditions were not materializing.53 Renamo´s military expansion 
increased the speed of villagization efforts, since Frelimo tried to keep the 
                                                 
51 C. Geffray & M. Pederson, ‘Sobre a guerra na província de Nampula. Elementos de 
análise e hipóteses sobre as determinações e consequências sócio-económicas locais’, 
Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, 4-5 (1986), 303-18 and C. Geffray, La 
Cause des Armes au Mozambique. Anthroplogie d’une Guerre Civile (Paris, 1990), 
published in Portuguese as A Causa das Armas. Antropologia da Guerra 
Contemporânea em Moçambique (Porto, 1991). 
52 Ibid. 5. 
53 The villagization programme, a cornerstone of the rural collectivization policy, had 
been approved at Frelimo’s third party congress in 1977. By the early 1980s, 1,350 
communal villages had been established, accommodating 18 per cent of the rural 
population, more than 1.8 million people. A. Dinerman, ‘In Search of Mozambique: The 
Imaginings of Christian Geffray in La Cause des Armes au Mozambique. 
Anthropologie d’une Guerre Civile’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 20, 4 (1994), 
571. 
  
268 Seibert 
peasants away from the rebels. Pereira suggests that the regime’s major concern 
with regard to villagization was the concentration of the rural people to exert 
political control, rather than to improve agricultural output by collective 
production.54 Increasingly peasants perceived villagization as a government 
attempt to facilitate tax collection, apply public corporal punishment and oblige 
people to participate in so-called voluntary labour. Frequently, discontented 
residents of communal villages who wanted to return to their former 
homesteads helped Renamo to destroy the newly formed settlements.  
The central government had substituted the local chiefs with administrators 
and party secretaries who often came from other regions, did not speak the local 
language and were not familiar with the local culture. The substitution with 
outside administrators of the régulos who derived their legitimacy and authority 
through the political and religious functions they exercised in their communities 
created considerable discontent in many rural areas. This dissatisfaction 
increased when the regime’s promises of an improved standard of living did not 
come about and the people were confronted with the hardships of the economic 
crisis and the regime’s coercive measures. In general, the new people in charge 
within the public administration and the economy throughout the country were 
southerners. This southern dominance, which was veiled by Frelimo’s anti-
tribal discourse of national unity, nurtured existing regional tensions that 
stemmed from the colonial period.55  
The disproportionately high number of senior positions occupied by people 
from the south has frequently been denounced by non-southerners as 
domination by a second Gaza Empire, a reference to the Gaza kingdom of the 
Nguni in the nineteenth century that controlled large parts of central 
Mozambique. The régulos, the former chiefs, were prohibited from exercising 
their political functions as early as 26 June 1975 since, according to the 
Frelimo, they had been part of the colonial system. Therefore many régulos 
were willing to support Renamo when the rebels appeared. In turn, Renamo 
accepted local traditions and religion, reinstated the former régulos and 
entrusted them with the public administration of the controlled area. Renamo 
restored customs such as polygamy and lobolo (bride price) that Frelimo had 
banned as feudal and reactionary practices.  
As a result of southern dominance after independence, the local elites in the 
centre and the north felt marginalized by Frelimo. There were certain ethnic 
groups (Ndaus, Sena, Macua) who were represented neither in the party nor in 
the state that also resented Frelimo. Not surprisingly, the interruption of traffic 
between Rhodesia and the seaport of Beira, as a consequence of the sanctions 
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introduced in 1976 against the Smith regime and the resulting economic decline 
of this city, were perceived by many local inhabitants as a deliberate measure 
imposed by the central government in Maputo. The results of the elections in 
October 1994 and December 1999 when Renamo gained a majority of the votes 
in the central and northern provinces, while Frelimo completely dominated the 
southern provinces and the capital city, emphasized the crucial role played by 
regional factors in Mozambican politics.  
In addition, Frelimo’s Marxist-inspired revolutionary campaign against all 
religions including ancestor worship as obscurantism and the harassment of 
churches and traditional healers in the first years after independence alienated 
large sectors of the rural population. Other groups that were opposed to Frelimo 
were the former prisoners of the re-education camps established right after 
independence, including former colonial officials and Frelimo opponents, and 
some 50,000 urban migrants who were considered unproductive and arbitrarily 
deported from the cities in the south to the rural areas in the north, particularly 
to Nampula and Niassa, as part of the Operação Produção (Operation 
Production) in 1983. Many of these men voluntarily joined Renamo since they 
were eager to take revenge on the government. For many who had initially been 
in favour of Frelimo, the rapid economic decline after independence, the 
resulting scarcity of consumer goods, poor marketing of agricultural products, 
and queues in the shops discredited the government’s programme of national 
reconstruction and constituted another factor in favour of Renamo.  
Naturally there was not always a direct correlation between discontent with 
Frelimo and acceptance or support of Renamo. However, it is unlikely that 
without the cooperation of the local population Renamo would have been able 
to expand to such an extent that it was able to mobilize support throughout the 
whole country. Renamo was more successful in capitalizing on popular 
disenchantment with Frelimo in central and northern Mozambique where 
specific social and cultural conditions prevailed that were unfavourable for 
Frelimo.56 The initial support for Renamo decreased over time due to the forced 
recruitment of youngsters and the permanent coercion of the rural population to 
supply food. Consequently many peasants fled from Renamo-controlled areas 
and those who remained tried to hide their possessions and produce in the bush. 
In response, Renamo increasingly resorted to terror and violence to force the 
local population’s submission in occupied areas.57 
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Violence and terror 
 
Renamo rarely challenged government forces directly but preferred to attack 
civilians in rural areas. In war in non-industrialized societies, plundering and 
pillaging for food and other supplies and the abduction of women for sexual 
services have always instilled greater fear in the local population than the 
violence of a true battlefield.58 Similar tactics were employed by Renamo in 
Mozambique where the preferred targets in the south and centre of the country 
included the majonijoni (the migrants who worked in the South African mines) 
whose houses were systematically looted due to their relative wealth.59 Many 
migrant workers lost everything they had accumulated.  
There appears to have been considerable regional variation in Renamo’s 
military tactics and strategies, recruitment methods and violence against 
civilians. In his report on Mozambican refugees, Gersony identified three areas 
under Renamo’s control according to the violence used against the population in 
each. The people living in tax areas that were located between the zones 
permanently controlled by Renamo and by the government were obliged to 
supply food to the guerrillas. The inhabitants of a control zone near a Renamo 
base had to provide forced labour including the transport of goods and booty to 
and between bases. They also had to provide food, and participate in patrolling 
and looting.60 The population within a control zone was composed of local 
inhabitants, government dissidents and people abducted from other areas. The 
social relations between guerrillas and civilians were based on a system of 
organized violence where any disobedience or resistance was severely 
punished. However, there are also reports of cordial relations between peasants 
and Renamo soldiers, who, for example, asked the villagers for goats and 
chickens and promised to replace them as soon as they could loot zones beyond 
their permanent control.61 Destruction zones were areas where Renamo had not 
established a permanent presence and in these zones the rebels frequently 
attacked and looted rural settlements and communal villages. 
 
Renamo violence against civilians 
As long as it enjoyed the support of local communities, Renamo was less cruel 
and violent in the centre and the north of the country than in the south where 
Frelimo had a strong base and from where most of its leaders originated. Some 
people living in areas occupied by Renamo even claimed never to have 
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witnessed any atrocities against civilians.62 However, the worst Renamo-
organized violence and atrocities against civilians occurred in the south and in 
government-controlled regions elsewhere in the country. Renamo’s violence 
against the rural population was instrumental in the sense that it undermined its 
legitimacy by demonstrating the inability of the Frelimo government to defend 
its population. Even spectacular mass killings like the July 1987 massacre of 
424 civilians in Homoine (Inhambane) were apparently not spontaneous actions 
of local commanders but were deliberately committed with the agreement of the 
Renamo leadership to force the government to surrender. The major massacres 
occurred around 1987 in the south of Mozambique after the new government 
under Joaquim Chissano had rejected negotiations and tried to win the war.63 
Yet, the rebel movement has never assumed responsibility for the massacres, 
which were counterproductive regarding its international reputation and in the 
end prevented Renamo from receiving official American-government support.  
During Renamo attacks, the principal targets were Frelimo party and state 
officials who were usually killed in front of the local population. Occasionally, 
local villagers had betrayed the officials to the arriving rebels64 and exemplary 
violence including public mutilations and executions served to intimidate the 
general population, maintain control, and prevent escape from the occupied 
areas. Such atrocities aimed at spreading the news about Renamo violence far 
beyond the operational area to break any possible resistance in advance of the 
rebels’ arrival. The rebels always allowed someone to escape to tell the 
terrifying story.65 Frequently, the executioners used machetes and knives 
instead of firearms since they would not alert government forces, saved 
ammunition and created a maximum of fear.  
Targets of systematic destruction were infrastructure such as local offices, 
schools and health posts because they symbolized the hated Frelimo state and 
represented a few of the regime’s success stories. The local church or mosque 
was often the only building that was not destroyed during a Renamo attack, 
since Renamo sought religious legitimacy inside and outside the country.66 The 
destruction of social infrastructure was part of a wider strategy based on the 
simple belief that whatever weakened Frelimo reinforced Renamo.67 However, 
the rebels also engaged in inconceivable acts of brutality against defenceless 
                                                 
62 Finnegan, A Complicated War, 72. 
63 Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg’, 21, 30. 
64 A. Cunhela, ‘Uma análise sobre o impacto da Guerra nos aspectos sócio-económicos 
em Morrumbala, Zambezia, 1982-1992’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo 
Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 4. 
65 K.B. Wilson, ‘Cults of Violence’, 527. 
66 Ibid. 540. 
67 Finnegan, A Complicated War, 77. 
  
272 Seibert 
people that defy any concept of rationality. Some of the excessive violence was 
directed at sexual taboos. Rebels raped women in the presence of their 
husbands, relatives and neighbours and in other cases, fathers were forced to 
rape their daughters, and brothers were coerced into have sex with their 
sisters.68 Obscure rites were also frequently practised by Renamo. For example, 
former captives reported that they had to drink water from the skulls of dead 
people.69 Wilson stresses that ritualized violence often has to be 
incomprehensible in order to have the desired effect.70 
 
Government atrocities 
The rural population also suffered from atrocities committed by government 
forces. People living in Renamo-controlled areas accused government soldiers 
of committing most of the violence directed at the local population.71 
Occasionally, people living in areas visited by Renamo guerrillas were accused 
by the local authorities of having permitted Renamo forces to pass through their 
area, before being executed. Peasants living in areas in central Mozambique, 
which had been recaptured by Frelimo, fled into the bush or to Malawi since 
they feared that government troops would kill them in retaliation for their 
supposed support of Renamo.72 Government soldiers who accompanied 
convoys of citizens to protect them from Renamo assaults simulated ambushes 
to rob the people of their property. To avoid the loss of goods during such a 
journey and to ensure a safe arrival at their destination people went to the 
barracks prior to departure to bribe the commander of the convoy.73  
When government troops surprised Renamo guerrillas they often did not 
return stolen goods to their owners but took possession of them themselves. 
Mucusete reports from Angoche (Nampula) that when the local population tried 
to flee during a Renamo attack in the forest they found the paths blocked by 
police and government soldiers who beat them up and forced them to return to 
their homes saying ‘Do you want to see us die alone?’.74 While fleeing to their 
hiding-places during Renamo attacks, the military often took the goods that the 
peasants tried to rescue. Most of the government’s popular militias were inferior 
to Renamo in terms of military training and equipment and were unable to 
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defend the people. Instead of defending the locals, many militia units abused 
their power by maltreating the population at control posts and during nightly 
patrols. Not receiving regular pay, the militias lived on what they confiscated 
from the locals or recaptured from Renamo forces.75 The situation of the regular 
troops was not much better. Due to insufficient supplies caused by 
organizational shortcomings and disrupted military logistics, particularly in 
remote areas, government forces suffered from a lack of food and ammunition, 
and their wages were paid months in arrears. Morale deteriorated and soldiers 
coerced the local population into providing them with women and foodstuffs, 
attacked houses and plundered villages. In addition they diverted food aid from 
government institutions and international organizations. Frelimo soldiers in the 
cities were much less dependent on local resources since they had access to 
food supplies that could be used for barter.  
 
 
The role of ritual power 
 
In its propaganda, Renamo claimed that it was fighting in an alliance with the 
ancestral spirits to return the country to its ancestral traditions. It accused 
Frelimo of showing total disrespect for local religion and culture. On the 
battlefield Renamo commanders did not only place their trust in their modern 
weapons and sophisticated radio communication, but frequently resorted to 
local diviners and spirit mediums to protect them in combat or to guarantee the 
success of an attack. By reverting to magical military powers, Renamo 
continued the old traditions of war medicines used during anti-colonial 
rebellions and pre-colonial wars.76 Matsangaíssa, who was surrounded by 
legends of magic powers and invulnerability, reportedly never waged an attack 
without first consulting his diviner. The same holds true for the majority of 
Renamo commanders.77 Renamo’s cult of violence terrified both the population 
and Frelimo soldiers, and its military successes were generally attributed to its 
superior magical powers.78 People were convinced that the rebels, and 
particularly the Ndau speakers among them who are famous for their ritual 
powers throughout Mozambique, had powerful magic at their disposal.79 The 
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fame of a local curandeiro who possessed the ability to make men resistant to 
bullets, invisible to the enemy or transform government bullets into water 
served to attract new recruits.80 The frequent consultation of their traditional 
healers gained Renamo the respect of the local people, who believe in the 
existence of powerful supernatural forces. On the other hand, spirit mediums 
working for Renamo forced peasants to cooperate with the rebels by praising 
their abilities, claiming that otherwise their ancestral spirits would become 
angry.81  
Local beliefs in spirits and magical powers have always been widespread 
among the entire population, including Frelimo followers. Cuahela reported 
from Zambezia that people believed that government troops only succeeded in 
killing a feared Renamo guerrilla after they had managed to tie him up and 
remove his magical power from his pocket, a knot of hair in which a human nail 
and a glass-bead were tied together.82 In the same province the population 
attributed the recapture of a district capital by government forces in late 1987 to 
the intervention of a curandeiro whose magic resulted in a complete loss of 
vigilance within the Renamo ranks on that day. As it was felt that successful 
military leaders owed their abilities to supernatural powers, particular efforts 
were made to defeat and kill them. After the war, former guerrillas owed their 
survival to the protection of their ancestral spirits and many demobilized rebels 
spent part of their demobilization allowance on conducting rituals to thank the 
spirits for their safe return.83 
As a result of the inability of government forces to protect the population, an 
armed peasant movement known as Naparama (meaning ‘irresistible force’ in 
the Makua language) emerged in Nampula in 1988, where it successfully fought 
against Renamo and subsequently expanded to Zambezia. Naparamas, who 
were armed with traditional weapons such as assegais and machetes, were 
feared because of their supernatural powers that involved what Wilson calls a 
‘cult of counter-violence’.84 Before they got their weapons, the peasant soldiers, 
who wore a red ribbon attached to their clothes, were initiated by being 
vaccinated with a medical plant that was rubbed into three cuts in their chests 
before they were plunged into water and had their bodies greased with oil. The 
commanders were initiated by the leader Manuel António, a Makua curandeiro 
who claimed to have died of measles only to be resurrected from the dead six 
days later and thought by Jesus Christ to make anti-bullet vaccines. The 
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syncretic Christian elements in António’s religious discourse distinguishes it 
from Renamo’s ritual powers that were derived from ancestral religious 
traditions. António’s fighters were forbidden to rape, argue with or steal from 
the local population, shake hands with married men and women, or to have sex 
on the day prior to a battle. As in the case of other ritually empowered people in 
Southern Africa, it was believed that breaking these rules would result in death 
during combat, since the fighter had lost his supernatural powers and was no 
longer resistant to bullets.  
The Naparamas also forced the local population to obey certain rules. People 
were not allowed to wash plates and pots in the river, shake off the water from 
washed clothes, beat clothes heavily during washing, spread out clothes on 
roofs, or pound grain at the end of the day. Disobedience required the 
summoning of the Renamo.85 The peasant soldiers did not constitute a full-time 
standing army but usually stayed at home and tilled their machambas, only 
fighting Renamo when called upon to do so. They attacked in their hundreds, 
armed with spears and machetes, rattling tin cans and blowing cow horns to 
terrify the enemy. Thanks to the military successes of the Naparama, thousands 
of displaced people could return to their home areas. António claimed to have 
some 30,000 men at his disposal86 and thanks to their magical protection, the 
Naparamas were believed to be able to fight the Renamo rebels without being 
hit by bullets themselves. Despite their superior arms, Renamo troops were so 
terrified by the appearance of Naparama fighters that the latter were able to 
withstand rebel attacks in large parts of northern Mozambique until António’s 
death in Macuse near Quelimane in December 1991. The Naparama were 
militarily successful since they came from the same cultural background as the 
Renamo guerrillas, which allowed their magical forces to become an effective 
weapon. Accordingly, Renamo only succeeded in defeating the Naparama after 
having regained the superiority of magical powers.87 In turn, Frelimo forces did 
not accuse Naparama of obscurantism but cooperated with them and supported 
them logistically. Frelimo soldiers are reported to have frequently asked them 
for their amulets to become resistant to bullets themselves.88 However, while 
Frelimo soldiers resorted to magic predominantly on an individual base, for 
both Renamo and Naparama forces, the traditional religious and ritual discourse 
constituted an integral part of their struggle. 
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Conclusion 
 
Renamo was set up by external forces hostile to the socialist Frelimo regime. 
However, the destabilization policy of the white minority regimes is insufficient 
explanation of the transformation of Renamo from a small rebel group into a 
powerful guerrilla army that controlled most of Mozambique by terrorizing the 
local populations. Large sections of the rural population facilitated the 
successful expansion of the rebel movement since they had been alienated from 
Frelimo by its forced collectivization of the countryside, the removal of 
traditional chiefs, and religious persecution. Entire regions and ethnic groups in 
northern and central Mozambique backed Renamo because they felt 
marginalized by the domination of southerners within the Frelimo regime. 
Regional divisions within Frelimo had emerged during the liberation struggle in 
the 1960s but historically their roots go back much further. Renamo’s electoral 
successes in the 1994 and 1999 elections, when the opposition party gained a 
majority of votes in most central and northern provinces, have ultimately 
confirmed that the movement has always enjoyed considerable regional support. 
Supernatural powers played an important role in this conflict. For Renamo, 
traditional religious discourse and resorting to magical rituals were integral 
parts of the war. Renamo committed the worst atrocities against civilians during 
the conflict in areas controlled by Frelimo and where the local population’s 
initial support started to decrease as a result of the rebels’ coercive measures. 
Renamo deliberately used excessive ritualized violence to instil a maximum of 
fear in the local population to maintain control and to guarantee supplies for 
their soldiers. According to this strategy, ‘cult’ violence had to be necessarily 
unpredictable, irrational and terrifying to achieve its intended goals. Renamo’s 
lack of mechanized transport and of supplies led to the recurrence of traditional 
methods of transporting goods and persons. The acquisition of supplies by 
attack and coercion became a salient feature of the war. However, the terror and 
violence of Frelimo forces should not be ignored. Government troops did not 
accept any passive neutrality and frequently perceived the local population in 
areas controlled or visited by Renamo as collaborating with the rebels. 
Summary justice was meted out. 
With both the government-controlled Frelimo forces and the Renamo rebels 
instilling fear in rural communities while expecting collaboration and 
cooperation in return, the result was a traumatized people who, regardless of 
which side they had initially supported, often became unsure of who was truly 
fighting on their behalf during this dark period in Mozambique’s recent past. 
 
 
 
